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Thinking Bodies  
The Spirit of a Latina Incarnational 
Imagination 
Mayra Rivera Rivera  
 
 
Habla con dejo de sus mares bárbaros, 
con no sé qué algas y no sé qué arenas; 
reza oración a dios sin bulto y peso 
~Gabriela Mistral, La Extranjera 
She speaks in the tones of her barbaric seas  
With who knows what algae and what sands;  
She prays to god without baggage and weight 
~Gabriela Mistral, The Foreigner 
 
Como un oleaje perpetuo, fragante, 
ella hace sonidos del mar. 
Inclinada se extiende y así 
suspira como si fuera una resaca delgadísima, 
como si fuera una palabra de ausencia. 
Entonces en el lienzo del silencio 
y en la misma orilla del tiempo,  
ella se inclina toda desnuda y desnuda 
se mira con el rostro 
del agua en sus palabras. 
~Marjorie Agosín, Idiomas 
 
 
Like a perpetual, sweet-smelling surf, 
she makes sounds of the sea.  
Bent over, she stretches out,  
sighs as if she where a reed-thin tide,  
as if she were a word of absence.  
Then, on the canvas of silence 
and on the very shore of time,  
she bends over, naked, and naked  
regards herself with the face  
of water in her words. 
~Marjorie Agosín, Languages 
 
 
Speaking a language shaped by the sea, with the face of the water in 
their words, both Gabriela Mistral and Marjorie Agosín evoke in their 
poems geographies of a country they have left behind. Their words have 
traces of algae and sand, of a naked body embraced by the sea. The poets’ 
fragrant verses have seduced me—though I tried to resist the spell of words 
about body and sea, alert to the dangers of bringing “body” too close to 
“nature.” Will her body be washed away by the sea’s unruly powers and be 
lost in its uncontrollable depth? Will she be seen as “merely” flesh, her 
carefully crafted words drowned in incomprehensibility, again dismissed as 
inadequate for theory or ineffective for politics? Her god too intimate with 
the turbulence of matter to be the subject of philosophy? 
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Fearing being caught in the fate that awaits nature/native/body, 
afraid that perception of irrationality may flood the wisdom of bodies, I 
tried to resist the poets’ enchantment. But thinking of bodies, I too conjure 
images of the sea. 
 
Questions of bodies, foreign words, and fragrant seas may appear as 
strange openings for a discussion of epistemology, concerned as it is with 
discerning the proper, reliable foundations for knowledge. In Western 
epistemological traditions sensuality and bodies have often been considered 
distractions to be overcome in order to attain true knowledge. Decolonizing 
epistemology implies questioning the privilege of those traditions. Indeed, 
taking epistemology as a central concern, decolonial theorists not only 
explore the implications of the power structures in the production of 
knowledge but also seek to articulate alternative understandings and 
visions. Focusing on Latina body-words, this essay seeks resources to think 
not only beyond the legacy of colonial/imperial knowledge but also beyond 
its disembodied definitions of “knowledge.” 
In the variegated intellectual traditions that constitute Latina studies, 
explorations of the legacies of colonialism in the Americas commonly 
imply theorizations of embodiment. There are very concrete reasons for 
this: Colonial-sexual violence against the African and indigenous women of 
the Americas indelibly marked the bodies of many of their descendants. 
Greed, violence, and enslavement literally became incarnate. They have left 
“memories in the flesh”—to adapt Luce Irigaray’s phrase1—and memories 
of the flesh seek theoretical articulation. Despite the evident dangers of 
being perceived yet again as one uttering barbaric words carrying who 
knows what algae or sand, or perhaps precisely because of the oceanic force 
of such speech, Latina efforts to decolonize epistemologies cannot abandon 
body-words.  
The corporeal effects of colonial histories cannot be neatly separated 
into physical and cognitive elements, for the genealogical traces of 
colonial-sexual violence are experienced in conjunction with the 
materialization of social and familial arrangements also introduced by 
colonial power. These new structures served as tools for “the organization 
of relations of production, of property rights, of cosmologies and ways of 
knowing,” all of which would have lasting effects in local and global 
understandings and experiences of embodiment.2  
In response to the codification of bodies and the organization of 
humanity based on biological traits, Latina decolonial theories uncover the 
constructed character of body-talk in ways that would be familiar to 
feminists attuned to Simone de Beauvoir’s celebrated statement: “One is 
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not born a woman, but becomes one.”3 In Latina theory, these becomings 
are distinctively historicized, not only in relation to patriarchy or sexual 
politics but also in relation to broader networks of power. It entails 
multidimensional deconstructions at the boundaries of identity that revolve 
around gender, sexuality, race, nationality, and coloniality of power.4 One 
might assert that Latina theories attend to the ambivalence of the identities 
that emerge from colonial encounters—identities that are openly and 
intensely sexualized, gendered, and racialized. But one would need to add 
that the aim is not simply to describe the configurations of power that have 
affected Latina bodies, but more significantly to reconfigure them by 
offering alternative theorizations of embodiment.  
The Latina works discussed here are marked by absence and 
longing, troubled by past memories and present uncertainties, moved by the 
elusive and fleeting touch of sensuality. They even thematize their 
silencing, the derision of their words along with the materiality they 
embrace. Attempting to speak the unspeakable is for these discourses not 
only revealing, but also a part of becoming.5 As they are understood in 
these works, bodies are not simply objects of study; body-words are not 
merely representational, but also performative and creative. Mythology is 
often creatively reinterpreted, including perceptive, creative musings into 
the spiritual dimensions of corporeal becomings. In their creative, ecstatic 
moves such body-words both intersect with and unsettle Christian 
metaphors, inciting the present reinterpretation of spirit and flesh. 
I must add a word of clarification here. The works of Chicana 
writers such as Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa are paradigmatic of 
the distinctive reconfigurations of the corporeal imaginary that we have 
come to associate more generally with Latina epistemologies.6 My 
discussion of Latina body-words is profoundly influenced by the works of 
these and other Chicana writers and especially by the works of theorists 
who have espoused their contributions beyond the fields of literary and 
ethnic studies. Yet I approach those contributions with a deep awareness of 
the violence implied in the slippage between “Chicana” and “Latina,” and 
of the particularities of Caribbean experiences veiled by both labels.7 The 
voices of Caribbean and other Latina theorists I included here therefore add 
important dissonance. However, I trust that the different collectivities that 
embrace a “Latina” stance may also embrace each other’s contributions to 
the task of theorizing embodiment, while carefully avoiding illusions of 
wholeness—in definitions of our fields as much as in models of 
embodiment. 
This essay engages a diverse group of Latina theorists to consider 
what they contribute to an exploration of flesh and spirit. I am suggesting 
that Latina theorizations of embodied becomings, what Moraga famously 
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called a “theory-in-the-flesh,” offer important resources for reimagining 
spirit. I hope these reflections will illustrate how Latina body-talk inflects 
spirit-talk, and how those challenges and visions may unfold in new 
perspectives on spirit-flesh. To discern these possibilities, I consider body-
words as they have already appeared in Latina theology and in Latina 
theory, and with this in mind I meditate toward the end of the essay on the 
incarnational spirit of those body-words. 
Theological Bodies 
The Argentinean theologian Marcella Althaus-Reid stands out for 
her consistent—and insistently transgressive—attempts to place bodies at 
the center of theology. She grounds her theology of the body in a basic 
tenet of liberation theology, namely that “Latin American liberation 
theology is based on the search for the materiality of transcendence.” That 
search leads liberation theologies to people’s stories, to everyday 
experiences, “because they reveal the falsity of the border limits between 
the material and divine dimensions of our lives.”8 
In U.S. Latina/o theology, this interest in the deconstruction of the 
rigid boundaries between materiality and divinity is evidenced in the 
privilege it has given to popular religiosity. As Roberto Goizueta describes 
it, Latina/o popular Catholicism recovers a medieval appreciation for a 
creation infused with divine presence. This was a faith “firmly anchored in 
the body: the body of the cosmos, the body of persons, the Body of 
Christ.”9 That worldview was almost lost both in the Reformation attacks 
against images and saints and in Catholic responses to such attacks, but its 
traces are still visible in “the faith of Hispanic people” which is “primarily 
embodied and expressed in and through symbol and ritual.”10 Through their 
interpretations of these religious practices, Latina/o theologians have 
emphasized the sacred elements in materiality and physicality, especially in 
the context of ritual practices. 
More direct explorations of the body appear in Latina/o theologians’ 
discussions of mestizaje/mulatez, which Ada María Isasi-Díaz identifies as 
“the locus theologicus” of her work.11 In colonial contexts, 
mestizaje/mulatez were pejorative terms for those of “mixed blood,” but 
they have now been reclaimed and redefined by Latina/o thinkers as a way 
of bringing together cultural, historical, and corporeal aspects of identity. 
Mestizaje/mulatez is, in Isasi-Díaz’s words, “the Hispanic/Latino 
incarnation of hybridity and diversity.”12 Benjamín Valentín observes that 
Latina/o theologians have used the concepts of mestizaje/mulatez to 
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elucidate “the abstruse evocations of rejection, pain, and spiritual 
searching” as well as the redemptive potential that they hold for self and 
society.13 These discussions about mestizaje/mulatez are part of Latina 
theology’s body-talk, and their broader implications for constructive 
theology continue to be debated and developed.  
Latina/o theologians’ attention to popular religiosity and embodied 
identities is consistent with liberation theology’s commitment to foreground 
the concrete experiences and material struggles of marginalized people: the 
of the poor and the disappeared, of those in pain and hungry, of those 
persecuted and tortured. What Althaus-Reid calls a “theology of the 
spiritually concrete and the materially spiritual”14 is an attempt to reclaim 
and extend that liberationist pledge, for the bodies in Latin American 
liberation theology ended up being too neatly organized, too readily sorted 
according to accepted political and theological categories, Althaus-Reid 
contends.15 In that neat and “decent” organization, liberation theology 
neglected rebellious, unruly, queer bodies. Furthermore, in the interest of 
concrete representations, these theologies lost a certain ghostliness that is 
also part of embodied life: the unseen, the ungraspable, and the no-longer-
living in and among us.16  
Althaus-Reid’s work seeks to move beyond these tendencies of 
orderliness by attending to common objects—not only in devotional 
contexts—and to rejected, disruptive bodies. She does not shy away from 
disorder. Althaus-Reid’s texts are populated with unruly bodies and body 
parts: Dirty feet are carefully observed in “Feetishism,” and numerous 
sexual organs are (perhaps fetishistically?) presented throughout Indecent 
Theology.17 These intensely carnal images coexist in her writings with other 
ghostly presences: rebellious corpses that refuse to disappear and poor, 
displaced people who haunt the living cities only in the shadows of the 
night—as fleeting presences.18 Their appearances disturb the boundaries of 
corporeality. 
The challenge to the myth of the stable, whole body performed 
through the irruption of multiple and incomplete bodies into theological 
discourses should be read, I think, alongside other attempts by Latina 
theorists to subvert “the founding myth of original wholeness, with its 
inescapable apocalypse of final return to a deathly oneness”—as Chela 
Sandoval describes it.19 This is an unavoidable step toward disrupting the 
myth of the unchangeable wholeness of truth. To seek what María Pilar 
Aquino calls “an evolving-becoming truth”20 entails the interrogation of the 
image of a self-present God, whose simple oneness depends on remaining 
unaffected by multiple, changing bodies. Given the power of the 
impassible, unchanging God in Christian imaginaries, incomplete and 
incoherent bodies may seem strange places to search for the materiality of 
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transcendence—or for transcendence in materiality. But this strangeness 
points to a key aspect of this project: a rethinking of divine transcendence 
that does not presuppose completeness or absolute separation, one that is 
more amenable to the flux and disruptions of the flesh. 
Whereas Althaus-Reid’s body images hardly add up to an organized, 
whole, unified body—or to a coherent theory of embodiment—they do 
produce aesthetic effects that are theologically significant. These effects 
may be similar to what Patricia Cox Miller describes, in her reading of 
hagiographic texts, as “visceral seeing.”21 Miller explores “narrative 
pictorial strategies” that draw readers “into the images by virtue of their 
very bodies.”22 Displaying “ambiguous corporealities”—bodies that are 
both ephemeral and tangible, both fragmented and whole—such texts 
“induced a stance for the beholder to occupy, a stance in which the senses 
had cognitive status and in which the intellect was materially engaged.”23 
Miller argues that such sensory realism is aimed at teaching “the reader 
how to see that the everyday life is saturated with the palpable” presence of 
the holy.24 Similarly, by displaying starkly carnal images and ambiguous 
corporealities, Althaus-Reid’s texts seem to aim at inciting visceral 
reactions in their readers and challenging the assumed boundaries between 
the sociopolitical, corporeal, and spiritual.  
However, Althaus-Reid’s shocking rhetorical strategies often 
threaten to reinscribe the all-too-familiar stereotypes of the hypersexual 
Latina—a problem that needs more careful attention. If coloniality of 
power produces not one but two or maybe more different gender systems 
for colonizing and colonized subjects, as María Lugones has persuasively 
argued, Latina critiques need to address the differences in constructions of 
gender and sexuality across the colonial divide.25 That is, they need not 
only challenge Victorian gender images by, for instance, reclaiming the 
spiritual dimensions of eroticism, as Althaus-Reid does. They must also 
address the intense sexualization of women on the other side of the colonial 
divide: what Lugones calls the “dark side” of the gender system, that is, the 
gender structures imposed on the colonized.  
Given this tendency of theological discourses either to ignore real 
bodies altogether or to idealize their beauty and their capacity for pleasure, 
Althaus-Reid’s work is a welcome provocation.26 Turning that provocation 
into a theoretical critique that attends to the resistance of bodies to rigid 
ordering systems and recognizes even the “untouchable” bodies of society27 
entails first a closer look at the paradoxes of embodiment. For that analysis 
I now turn to works in Latina studies (outside of theological fields), and in 
so doing I return to the sea.  
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Disruptive Bodies 
The Puertorrican poet Luz María Umpierre links her critique of the 
dominant ordering of bodies to a well-known symbol of the island: the 
walls of the city of San Juan.28 Built to protect the city against foreign 
invasion during the Spanish colonial period, the old walls are today proudly 
displayed in souvenirs and tourism propaganda. That a fortified city may 
signify Puertorrican identity provokes Umpierre, who sees in it an 
appropriate symbol of the traps of the closed ideals of national identity and 
its compulsory heteronormativity. The walls of the city lock bodies in 
restrictive scripts; the walls of the city isolate the island from the sea. To 
allow for the needed contact between island and sea, Umpierre calls for 
words: “for the sea to come / to touch that island’s land / one needs / your 
words.”29 These words are needed not to impose order on the unruly sea, 
but to liberate the sea from the wall. These are not the seemingly 
disembodied words commonly associated with creation myths; this is not a 
version of logocentrism. These are body-words that emerge from the 
islanders’ bodies, from their mouths, stomachs, esophaguses, and so forth. 
Body-words contain for the poet the force that can erode the oppressive 
walls of nationalism and heteronormativity and expose identities to the 
touch of the sea—the watery medium of connection between shores and an 
agent of continual change.30 
The effects of colonial history and nationalism on the bodies of the 
island and its subjects, to which Umpierre alludes, are not unrelated to the 
effects of racial ideologies in Latina bodies. For even when focusing mainly 
on the corporeal experiences that take place in the continental United 
States, Latina discourses generally stay in touch with the movements 
between shores and across borderlands that mark and shape peoples’ 
bodies.31 Standing between shores, in literal or figurative “exile,” such 
bodies are often also in “sexile.” As in Umpierre’s poem, Latina body-
words seek to erode the confining structures of U.S. national, racial, and 
sexual ideologies. 
The structures that constrain and regulate identities function in part 
through appeals to the body that naturalize social constructions. Yet the 
boundaries between discursive claims and bodily experience are hardly 
impermeable. Bodies are formed and deformed as they are read in their 
social contexts, as they are touched by others. Those who are stigmatized 
often experience being caught in the dominant gaze, which affects the 
developments of their “bodily schema,” as Fanon would put it.32 The 
wounds produced by the seemingly disembodied gaze are felt viscerally, 
but their meanings might remain inscrutable. Such experiences are often 
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characterized by a deep sense of uncertainty: Those who are subject to an 
objectifying gaze are unable to fully decipher just what the observed body 
signifies to the observer. Against the expectations of certainty produced by 
the naturalization of corporeal markers of identity, Latina/o body-talk often 
foregrounds—even dramatizes—puzzlement. The meaning of his own skin 
color is Richard Rodriguez’s recurrent question in Brown.33 Rodriguez 
ponders how the import of his brown skin shifts as he moves between 
worlds: the world of white Americans, where he “felt least certain about the 
meaning of [his] brown skin”; the racially diverse world of the early civil 
rights movement, where he felt “as safe as [he] ever felt”; the later world of 
clearly demarcated identities, where he no longer felt at home in the 
gatherings of ethnic groups other than his own. Brownness, he concludes, is 
not only an unstable sign; it is also an elusive one that simultaneously 
invites and resists being deciphered.34 
The uncertainties of corporeal identity affect not only public 
interactions like the ones just described, but also intimate familiar relations. 
Pained by the awareness that her own light skin has given her privileges 
that are denied to her own mother, Moraga calls attention to the unreliable 
grounds of social identification. 
See this face? 
 Wearing it like an accident 
Of birth 
 It was a scar sealing up 
A woman . . . 35 
Thus Moraga describes her experience of having her body read in the 
United States: a complex heritage reduced to the visible: a face, a sign, a 
scar. As Martín Alcoff observes, although “structural power relations . . . 
[determine] the meanings of our identities . . . the focal point of power most 
often operates precisely through the very personal sphere of our visible 
social identities.”36 The fissures of a racially divided social body fracture 
families along the differences in visible traits of their members. Even when 
those differences are the random outcome of genetic chance, they acquire 
added weight as signs of “the real” and thus as perceived evidence for 
social classification. 
Visible corporeal traits become social data; social classifications 
become bodily wounds. Thus, the critical power of body-words stems from 
their ability, on the one hand,  to resist the reduction of the body to 
biological inheritance and, on the other hand, avoid the illusion of freedom 
to choose social affiliations unencumbered by the body and its history. 
Indeed, by highlighting the effects on her most intimate relationships of her 
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corporeal entanglements with oppressive value systems, Moraga avoids 
such illusions of absolute freedom. Skin for Moraga is not only a mark of 
her ancestry, but also and simultaneously its mask. It is an accident and a 
scar that separates her from her mother—and unites her with her oppressor. 
Although a lighter skin can easily lead to participation in a system of 
clearly demarcated fields of power, it is often also a source of 
estrangement. This estrangement can be felt viscerally, for as she says, 
“The object of oppression is not only someone outside my skin, but the 
someone inside my skin.”37 The tension is inescapable. “Both strains [the 
conquistador and the native] contributed to their bodies, to their waking 
spirits,” Rodriguez writes, as he draws the crucial implication: 
“Righteousness should not come easily to any of us.”38  
Locating the subject in relation to the native/conquistador dyad, 
however, obliterates the African influence that is essential for the 
Caribbean body imaginary, a problem that Isasi-Díaz has tried to address by 
insisting that we link mestizaje to the term mulatez. The simple dyadic 
structure native/conquistador may also, and more problematically, lead to 
construing identity as biological inheritance made up of the mixture of 
discrete substances. A theorization of embodiment needs to challenge such 
reductive understandings of inheritance. Yet, as an epistemological critique, 
allusions to the native/African/conquistador elements exemplify the 
multiplicity of relationships that constitute a body—incorporating the 
familiar and the unknown, the visible and the invisible, the nurturing and 
the oppressive. Attending to that multiplicity contributes to the disruption 
of myths of homogeneous subjectivity and unambiguous identification. 
It is not only the complexity and irreducible multiplicity of 
biological inheritance that we must assert; we also need to scrutinize the 
analytical categories used for such work. Such a critique is implicit in 
Gloria Anzaldúa’s question: “Just what did she inherit from her ancestors? . 
. . [W]hich is the baggage from the Indian mother, which is the baggage 
from the Spanish father?”39 Highlighting the implications of differentiating 
between race, ethnicity, and social ideology, Anzaldúa adds, “Pero es difícil 
differentiating between lo heredado, lo adquirido, lo impuesto.”40 The 
uncertainties of heritage are clearly irreducible.41 In contrast to the apparent 
clarity and stability of the theoretical categories that are used to describe it, 
self-identity is conflictive and puzzling, and its articulations should resist 
the illusions of epistemological certainty. Highlighting the perplexity of 
their own attempts at self-representation, Latina body-words may call into 
question the compartmentalization of identity produced by the 
naturalization of categories of analysis, not by ignoring the body, but by 
bringing theory closer to the flesh. 
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The apparent celebration of the racial impurity associated with 
Latina theories is best understood in conjunction with its critique of, and 
invitation to move beyond, the illusion of purity in U.S. culture. At the 
heart of U.S. culture’s privilege of purity, Rodriguez observes, is a 
repression of a male erotic fantasy and an enforced silence around the 
history of race in the United States. “When mulatto was the issue of white 
male desire, mulatto was unspoken, invisible, impossible.”42 And brown 
bodies may be seen as icons of terrifying, unnamed desires of the American 
symbolic. Rodriguez’s goal is to turn that anxiety into a provocation that 
may lead to a deeper questioning of the very foundations of U.S. racial 
ideology. He turns brown into a category of analysis. “Brown made 
Americans mindful of tunnels within their bodies, about which they did not 
speak; about their ties to one another, about which they did not speak. This 
undermining brown motif, the erotic tunnel, was the private history and 
making of America.”43 The return of such suppressed knowledge, appearing 
in a story or body, produces violent anxiety.44 
The challenge to acknowledge, perhaps even embrace, impurity 
entails for Rodriguez an epistemological shift to recognize “the ability of 
language to express two or several things at once, the ability of bodies to 
experience two or several things at once.”45 And this affirmation of 
multiplicity is a sexual challenge too. We observed that in Moraga’s work a 
woman’s skin appears as the site of memories of the touch of the maternal 
connection as well as of painful and guilt-ridden separation from her brown 
mother. However, despite her light skin, heterosexual ideologies “darken” 
her; because she desires women, Moraga considers her sex “brown.”46 A 
body acquires contrasting meanings in relation to different axes of power: 
Visible traits clash with familiar and biological bonds; sexual desires 
disturb ethnic affiliations, and so on. The disparate social meanings 
projected onto a body unavoidably mark it with incongruent desires and 
irreducible tensions, though never completely or unilaterally. The 
contradictory effects that different ideologies have on a body do not entail a 
simple internalization of social differences. Espousing subjectivities where 
“the individual is herself seen as ‘fragmented’ and ‘contradictory,’<HS>” 
does not entail “displacing attention from the distinctions that exist 
between” bodies, Paula Moya asserts.47 Instead, the goal here is to trace 
how the rifts that divide collectivities from one another, fragmenting the 
social body, materialize in unique but complex forms of embodiment—and 
in their transfigurations. 
Corporeal pain, difficulty, and failure are undeniable effects of 
patterns of social discrimination, but their articulation cannot be reduced to 
expressions of victimhood or fatalism. If bodies have the ability to 
experience several things at once, they can also hold together pain and joy, 
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failure and hope—and creatively transform those experiences. Whereas 
Yvonne Yarbro-Bejerano characterizes Moraga’s depictions of identity as 
“non-redemptive,”48 I read in such refusals to resolve the tensions of 
sociocorporeal existence glimpses of an open-ended view of salvation. In 
this model, redemption is never accomplished once and for all: It takes 
place in the transient, finite events of our lives and in the midst of the 
ambiguities and potentialities of our social relations. Exposing social 
structures and practices that inhibit corporeal flourishing reveals 
possibilities for unsettling them, thus opening spaces where new 
relationships may emerge. Yet the envisioned end is not the elimination of 
the tensions of corporeality in order to produce a coherent, whole body. 
Such an ideal would reinscribe what we referred to before as “the founding 
myth of original wholeness, with its inescapable apocalypse of final return 
to a deathly oneness,”49 that in effect covers up multiplicity under 
ideologies of purity or homogeneity. Instead, we are seeking visions of 
redemption in which bodies become capable of embracing their multiplicity 
without having to become one.  
A creative articulation of such longing for the transfiguration of 
bodily experience is represented in the song titled “Raza Pura” (Pure 
Race). The context is not the U.S. “mainland,” but Puerto Rico. Based on 
the first verses of the song—“I am of a pure race / pure and rebellious”—
the song may seem to espouse a problematic celebration of racial purity. 
But as the song proceeds to describe the conflict and violence that marks 
the subject’s history, it demonstrates the impossibility of any simplistic 
acceptance of that ideal of purity. Indeed, the song displaces the logic of 
purity through parodic repetition. The claims to a “pure race” are 
immediately followed by a first-person description of its wounded body: “I 
am of a pure race which has had nails in its hands / and scars on its knees.” 
The implicit links between Jesus’ crucifixion and slavery lead to a 
redefinition of the claimed “purity”: “I am Borincano / black and gypsy / I 
am taíno.” Clearly and defiantly, the song affirms the irreducible 
multiplicity of the narrator’s genealogy. But it simultaneously constitutes 
its complex corporeal history as the basis for a strange purity defined not by 
assumed biological homogeneity, but in relation to struggle, survival, and 
transformation. “I am tears and also pain / for all that I’ve lived / for all that 
I’ve suffered / I am of a pure race / pure and rebellious.” While 
foregrounding experiences of violence and pain, the subject is not depicted 
as an object defined by victimization, but rather an active agent who makes 
“song with the chains,” “escaping from the whip / and stealing magic from 
death.” The body appears as the site of historical conflict and oppression as 
well as the source of mysterious, creative powers for resisting, challenging, 
and transgressing the logic, the “knowledge,” that supports her 
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subordination. The memory of an incarnate past and the articulation of 
improbable hopes combine—even in song—to effect the materialization of 
a new self. 
In these transformative visions, bodies do not leave behind their 
memories of pain and loss; nor do they dream of attaining absolute freedom 
from social constraints in such a way that bodies could re-create themselves 
independently of others. At its most fundamental level, bodies are 
constituted, understood, and experienced in relation to others—not only to 
those others under whose gaze we feel the power of social controls but also 
those familiar bodies among which we first learned to see ourselves as 
individuals. Physically and cognitively, bodies are shaped by other bodies 
and through them they are marked by their meanings in society. Those 
processes are fraught with uncertainty, yet they are also dynamic and open 
to transformation through performative interventions: the ritual practices of 
popular religiosity, artistic creations, social activism, critical writing. Those 
performative interventions are inherently relational: emerging from and 
limited by social and familiar bonds, lured and empowered by the 
movements of the spirit in the flesh. 
Spirit-Flesh 
The ceremony always begins for me in the same way . . . 
always the hungry woman. Always the place of disquiet moves 
the writing to become a kind of excavation, an earth-dig of the 
spirit found through the body. The impulse to write may begin 
in the dream, the déjà-vu, a few words, which once uttered 
through my own mouth or through the mouth of another, refuse 
to leave the body of the heart.  
Cherríe Moraga 
The body-words presented in the previous sections emerge from 
places of disquiet. Uneasiness, tremors, and desire give impulse to hungry 
searches and distinctive modes of writing. Latina body-words attempt to 
articulate not only the historical and social determinations of corporeality 
but also that which exceeds representation and yet gives impulse to 
speaking and writing: the body’s unruly materiality, its mysterious 
spirituality. Such modes of writing invite an explicitly theological reading. 
The aim of this reading is not to Christianize Latina theoretical 
contributions by subsuming them under doctrinal language. Instead I seek 
to allow Christian discourses to be affected, to be disturbed yet again, by 
accounts of the movements of the spirit found through the bodies of those it 
has often ignored.50  
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A discussion of “the spirit found through the body,” of spirit in the 
flesh, can hardly avoid engaging the ancient insights of the “incarnation”: 
that central teaching of God in carne. The earliest authorities of the 
Christian tradition declared it a heresy to undermine the startling 
affirmation of divinity in the flesh. But theology all too often moves in the 
opposite direction—turning away from the realm of unruly earthy bodies. 
In its dogmatic formulations, the incarnation tends to be safely contained 
within Jesus’ skin or reconceived in highly abstract, metaphysical terms 
that in effect distance the incarnation from our ordinary bodies: from the 
everyday experiences of working and dancing, praying and protesting, 
making bread and making love. 
To take Latina theory as a starting point for an incarnational 
imagination, as I am suggesting here, is already to resist the tendency to 
circumscribe the incarnation to one body or to a one-time event that proves 
the rule of an otherwise disembodied deity. It is to affirm with Ivone 
Gebara that “the incarnation, the presence of the greatest of mysteries in our 
flesh, is more than Jesus of Nazareth.”51 Rather than setting the incarnation 
in opposition to our carnality, this reading seeks to embrace the 
incarnation’s unfettered bond to our flesh. Attending to the spirit in the 
flesh of rejected, disorderly bodies is hardly to dismiss Jesus’ body. Instead 
we read his body—a material, finite, stigmatized, vulnerable body—as 
revealing the scandal of divinity in the flesh, or more accurately, of the 
divine becoming flesh. We take ever more seriously the transformative 
power of a singular person, a unique history, the significance of the wounds 
that mark even a glorified body.  
An interpretation of the incarnation as “the greatest of mysteries in 
our flesh” implies, methodologically, openness to learn from real, finite 
bodies, to seek the wisdom of body-words and their transformative power. 
This in turn entails a challenge to entrenched assumptions about the 
orientation of spiritual pursuits. The mind/body, spirit/matter dualisms 
pervasive in Western epistemologies lead to depictions of human 
development (and knowledge) as movements away from bodily “instincts” 
toward “rational thought,” away from flesh/nature/mother toward culture 
conceived as the realm of the “free spirit.” This reign of culture, it is well 
known, has been consistently associated with the agency of men/fathers, 
specifically of those who, by occluding their own dependence on the 
physical labor of women and disenfranchised men, may entertain the 
fantasy of life unencumbered by materiality or relationships. Reason and 
culture are thus imagined as rising above bodies and matter. Standard 
depictions of spiritual development assume the same path. Christian 
theologians and mystics commonly describe spiritual growth as ascension 
toward the airy heavens. In contrast, I am intentionally adopting Moraga’s 
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depiction of the spiritual pursuit as a movement of excavation or an earth-
dig—a movement that takes us deeper into our fleshliness.  
Through my reading of the Latina theorizations of corporeality, I 
have sought to foreground the dynamic and relational nature of such 
fleshliness. The challenges to the myths of original wholeness, 
homogeneous subjectivity, unambiguous identification, the illusions of 
purity and visual certainties, for instance, attempt to open up spaces for a 
complexly political model of carnality. In that view, bodies are always 
becoming through processes of identification and differentiation, 
objectification and transgression, fragmentation and transmutation. A 
theology-in-the-flesh also complicates and implicates the divine in these 
corporeal processes—the materialization of social relations, the 
enfleshment of the past in genes and memories, the transfiguration of 
corporeal wounds and social relations.  
The intricate constitution of bodies that are simultaneously social, 
material, and spiritual would be undermined by conceptions of the spirit as 
a simple being or as a force that aims at permanent completion and 
wholeness—views that betray an epistemological privilege of oneness over 
plurality. The spirit that I am invoking here is not imagined as an alien 
element added to earthy objects. It is not an external container, a 
teleological goal, or an archetypal form that would gather the complexity of 
flesh into a unified whole. The spirit is that intrinsic part of the flesh. To 
emphasize the continuity between material and spiritual dimensions of 
embodiment I use the term “spirit-flesh.” Just as “body-words” names 
discourses grounded on the continuity between corporeality and language, 
“spirit-flesh” emphasizes the inseparability of these concepts. In “spirit-
flesh,” the hyphen marks a boundary of distinction that does not tend to 
separation. Spirit and flesh flow into one another, each transfigures the 
other. The boundary between them remains as elusive as it is vital.52 
Spirit-flesh is the substance of corporeality—its matter and energy—
which is shaped by, but may also unsettle, layers of social and historical 
inscription and may disrupt old patterns of materialization. Yet, the living 
energy of the spirit-flesh does not eliminate the ambiguities of bodies that 
are ephemeral and tangible, fragmented and manifold, neither whole nor 
deficient. Thus the spirit is not to be associated with triumphalism or 
ideologies of absolute purity or perfection. Pain, difficulty, and failure are 
not antithetical to the movements of the spirit-flesh, for it is not 
independent of sociocorporeal life. In the transient events of finite, 
vulnerable existence, the spirit-flesh makes possible the transfiguration of 
our wounds and the incarnation of improbable hopes. This is the spirit, not 
of simple belongings, but of hybrid becomings. 
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The common depictions of spirit as primordially immaterial are 
challenged by these affirmations of spirit-flesh as constitutive of our 
bodies, while recognizing the spirit also in the nonhuman elements on 
which life depends. The biblical images of spirit as fire, water, and wind 
capture the material qualities of its life-sustaining energies, as well as its 
fluid and transforming power. We can recover the dynamic materiality of 
these images of the spirit as part of the work of countering received 
traditions that dismiss the epistemic import of materiality. These elemental 
images—like those of sea, algae, and sand identified in this essay’s opening 
poems—may also help us reclaim the importance of the nonhuman 
elements in shaping of our corporeality. Regarding ourselves “with the face 
of water in [our] words” is to begin to erode the anthropocentrism of 
modern cosmologies and their ideologies of dominance.  
The spirit-flesh is never simply our own; it can never be fully 
contained within the boundaries of the self. In contrast to atomistic views of 
embodiment, this reading asserts that our bodies are irreducibly linked to 
the nonhuman elements that sustain life; the marks of savage seas are 
sometimes legible in our body-words. Our bodies are shaped by some 
others whom we see and touch, as well as by those we perceive only as 
ghostly presences.53 Earlier I referred to Althaus-Reid’s allusions to the 
ghostly as a way to bring to our attention the traces of the no-longer-living 
in our selves, to the unseen presences of the excluded ones, as well as to the 
indeterminate aspects of bodily identity. Forgotten histories, suppressed 
knowledge, and ignored relationships do return, but they do not always 
appear with the weight of certainty that accompanies “reasonable” facts that 
can be observed from a safe distance. Instead they are experienced as 
fleeting insights or disquieting tremors in our bodies. We cannot be certain 
about just what we inherited from our ancestors—“which is the baggage 
from the Indian mother, which is the baggage from the Spanish father,” 
which is the baggage from the African parents? We cannot clearly 
differentiate “between lo heredado, lo adquirido, lo impuesto.”54 Yet we 
know that the past is not simply superseded by the present, the ancestors are 
not merely outside our skin. Certain elements of the past and some aspects 
of the bodies of others are inherent in our own; as ghostly presences they 
remind us of our elusive, intimate connections with them. 
Ghostly presences remind us that the spirit-flesh is never ahistorical, 
even if it lures us beyond what has been. The longings and courage to 
articulate hidden memories of the flesh are also associated with the 
movements of the spirit. Indeed, encounters with the past are sometimes 
represented as the presence of the spirits. Although modern Christianity has 
not been generally hospitable to talk of spirits from the past and has 
attempted to clearly differentiate the Holy Ghost from all other ghosts, we 
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do find an image of the spirit as facilitator of memory in the Gospel of 
John. In that gospel’s narrative, the spirit that was in Jesus infuses his 
followers and witnesses after his death. Tellingly, the spirit comes to them 
from the stigmatized body of a man who had been executed, a spectral body 
now able to walk through walls and yet still visibly wounded, still bearing 
the marks of violence on his flesh. How can this image not remind us of the 
ghostly appearances that populate the pages of the narratives of oppressed 
communities? The spirit that Jesus breathes into his followers is aptly 
called the spirit of truth, for it will remind the emerging community what 
they learned and experienced; it will also help them understand the baffling 
events of their past. The Johannine spirit is thus divine presence in 
remembrance—indeed, the very possibility of relating to the past. 
Latinatheory’s commitment to remember may resonate with the image of a 
spirit of remembrance as a spirit of truth. It may imagine the spirit 
enlivening memories in our flesh, inspiring attunement to their concreteness 
and their fluidity, while acknowledging in humility the irreducible 
uncertainties of remembrance. 
The spectral elements, disconcerting as they may be, are not opposed 
to the body: They represent the fluent, fluid, dispersive aspects of flesh, of 
subjects that defy objectification. Ancestral memories haunt our present 
experiences, yet these do not exhaust the spectral elements of embodiment. 
A kind of ghostliness haunts even the most concrete characterizations, 
pointing beyond the represented to that which eludes representation, that 
for which we don’t have concepts or words, that which unsettles established 
rationality and resists closure.  
“I perceived a language of the ephemeral, the unseen, and the half-
present that expressed the spiritual as a reference either to the divine or to 
that which is socially ghostly—certain bodies, desires, cultures, even 
locations. In this sense, the artwork itself was altar-like.”55 Thus Laura 
Pérez describes her analysis of Chicana art.56 By depicting the 
unrepresented and unrepresentable elements in the spiritual and social 
realms, such artistic works invite us to explore corporeal mystery in 
nonreductive ways. “Spirit works,” as Pérez aptly calls them, do not simply 
uncover suppressed knowledge, they “teach us to perceive and imagine 
differently.”57 Corporeal mystery is thus not dismissed as just a regrettable 
effect of ignorance or mystification. For in our dark or light skins, in our 
visible and invisible traits, in our unruly desires and sensitive wounds, the 
mysterious powers of spirit-flesh enable the materialization of 
unforeseeable possibilities.  
This vision of spirit-flesh strives to maintain the balance between an 
awareness of vulnerability and a defiant trust in life. Refusing to leave 
behind the body of the heart or the memories of our flesh, we trust the 
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energies of spirit-flesh. Such a trust differs from the sense of security found 
behind a fortified wall. Instead it is the kind of trust found by those who 
expose themselves to the connecting, transforming touch of the sea. 
Turning what we have been toward what we may yet become, a Latina 
image of spirit-flesh reclaims the wisdom of bodies to re-envision 
“salvations” that do not abandon corporeality, finitude, or its wounds. By 
uttering words impregnated with traces of sand and sea, Latina thought may 
keep drawing epistemology and body closer, as it brings forth incarnate 
words. 
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